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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tara Moskios appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict 
finding her guilty of trafficking in marijuana. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After officers executed a search warrant and found approximately six 
pounds of marijuana in his home, Robert Tomlinson agreed to work for law 
enforcement as a confidential informant. (Tr., p.110, L.1 - p.111, L.3, p.210, 
L.21 - p.212, L.4.) Tomlinson advised Detective Robert Berrier that he obtained 
his marijuana from Brian Pinto, who lived in Kuna, Idaho, and Carlos Pinto, who 
lived in Bend, Oregon. (Tr., p.111, L.24 - p.113, L.14, p.212, Ls.5-15, p.227, 
Ls.14-15.) On December 10, 2009, at Detective Berrier's direction, Tomlinson 
contacted Brian Pinto, who informed him that Carlos Pinto would be traveling 
from Bend to Kuna that day and would be bringing with him 21 pounds of 
marijuana. (Tr., p.113, L.20 - p.115, L.19, p.235, L.22 - p.240, L.1; State's 
Exhibit 1.) Tomlinson arranged to stop by Brian Pinto's house that evening for 
the purpose of obtaining more marijuana. (State's Exhibit 1.) 
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 10, 2009, officers observed a 
Nissan Xterra arrive at Brian Pinto's residence. (Tr., p.121, L.25 - p.122, L.5, 
p.269, L.16 - p.270, L.11.) The Xterra was registered to Tara Moskios who, at 
the time, was Carlos Pinto's fiancee. (Tr., p.123, Ls.5-10, p.370, L.22 - p.371, 
L.22.) Carlos and Moskios both exited the vehicle, and Moskios carried her two-
year-old son into the house. (Tr., p.270, L.12 - p.271, L.7, p.371, Ls.15-22, 
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p.379, Ls.19-23.) Carlos went to the back of the Xterra and, with Brian Pinto's 
assistance, retrieved some luggage, including a large black duffel bag that 
Carlos had "load[ed] up" with marijuana earlier in the day. (Tr., p.270, L.23 -
p.271, L.14, p.372, L.19 - p.373, L.6, p.380, L.9 - p.381, L.6.) 
Shortly after Carlos and Moskios arrived at Brian Pinto's residence, 
Tomlinson, fitted with a wire and carrying $13,000.00 in pre-recorded "buy 
funds," went to the residence to consummate the previously arranged drug 
transaction. (Tr., p.119, Ls.2-17, p.123, L.11 - p.125, L.8, p.241, L.5 - p.242, 
L.1, p.247, Ls.10-12; State's Exhibit 2.) When Tomlinson entered the house 
Brian Pinto and his fiancee, Samantha Martindale, were sitting at the dinner 
table with Carlos Pinto and Moskios. (Tr., p.247, L.13 - p.248, L.6.) Tomlinson 
engaged Carlos and Moskios in a brief conversation about their trip, during which 
Moskios talked about having driven to Kuna with "21 Ps in the back of [her] car." 
(Tr., p.124, L.16 - p.126, L.7, p.193, Ls.2-6, p.248, Ls.7-14, p.249, Ls.2-24; 
State's Exhibit 2.) She and Carlos also speculated that "cruising with the family" 
had helped them avoid being stopped by a police officer who had followed them 
for several miles during their trip. (Tr., p.126, Ls.1-6, p.250, Ls.6-13; State's 
Exhibit 2.) Following this conversation, Brian Pinto took Tomlinson to the master 
bedroom, where Brian gave Tomlinson six pounds of marijuana and Tomlinson 
gave Brian the $13,000.00 in pre-recorded funds to pay for a prior transaction. 
(Tr., p.126, Ls.8-15, p.188, Ls.17-21, p, 127, L.6 - p.128, L.19, p.250, L.14 -
p.251, L.2, p.253, L.8 - p.256, L.19; State's Exhibit 2.) Brian retrieved the 
marijuana from the same large black duffel bag that he had earlier removed from 
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Moskios' Xterra. (Tr., p.137, Ls.9-18, p.257, Ls.16-20, p.260, Ls.6-10, p.276, 
Ls.14-24.) 
After the controlled buy, police executed a search warrant on Brian Pinto's 
residence. (Tr., p.129, Ls.4-10, p.272, Ls.3-17, p.319, L.24 - p.320, L.9.) 
During the search officers found approximately $14,000.00 in cash - $13,000.00 
of which matched the pre-recorded buy funds (Tr., p.135, Ls.5-20, p.290, L.16 -
p.292, L.4, p.336, L.24 - p.337, L. 17) - and over 23 pounds of marijuana (Tr., 
p.134, L.13- p.135, L.4, p.135, L.21 - p.136, L.13, p.137, Ls.7-18, p.138, L.13-
p.139, L.19, p.323, L.5 - p.335, L.19, p.337, L.18 - p.340, L.11, p.361, Ls.21-24, 
p.364, Ls.10-18). The police arrested Moskios, Martindale, Brian Pinto and 
Carlos Pinto and took them to the police department where they were 
interviewed by Detective Berrier. (Tr., p.141, Ls.6-18, p.144, Ls.2-8, p.148, L.16 
- p.154, L.4.) After waiving her Miranda rights, Moskios told the officer that she 
had lived with Carlos Pinto in Bend, Oregon, for several years; that she owned 
the Xterra; that she knew what the odor of marijuana smelled like; that she knew 
there was 21 pounds of marijuana in her vehicle; and that Carlos had obtained 
the marijuana from a medical marijuana plant in southern Oregon. (Tr., p.151, 
L.7 - p.154, L.1.) 
A grand jury indicted Moskios for trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.22-24.) 
Pursuant to the state's motion, the case was consolidated with the cases of her 
co-defendants, Brian Pinto, Carlos Pinto and Samantha Martindale. (R., pp.9-
10.) Brian and Carlos pied guilty before trial. Moskios and Martindale pied not 
guilty and were tried jointly. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found each of 
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them guilty of trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.169-72; Tr., p.526, L.11 - p.527, 
L.13.) The district court entered judgment and imposed upon Moskios a unified 
sentence of five years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.245-48.) Moskios timely 
appealed. (R., pp.278-81.) 
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ISSUES 
Moskios states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was reversible error committed when testimony came in 
which was ruled as prohibited by the Judge's ruling regarding the 
inadmissible evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b)? 
2. Did the District Court err when allowing questioning on 
cross-examination which was outside the scope of direct 
examination for the witness Carlos Pinto? 
3. Were the cases which were consolidated improperly joined 
and thus unduly prejudicial? 
4. Did a failure to file for relief from prejudicial joinder in this 
case amount to ineffective assistance of counsel arising to a level 
to be addressed upon direct appeal? 
5. Did the District Court Judge err in improperly denying 
language the defense proposed for jury Instruction Number 11? 
6. Does the cumulative effect of these errors warrant a new 
trial in Ms. Moskios' case? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Must this Court decline to consider Moskios' claim of improper joinder 
because she failed to preserve the issue below and has failed to argue, much 
less establish, fundamental error? 
2. Has Moskios failed to present her ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
for appellate review? 
3. Did Moskios fail to preserve for appeal her claim that evidence was 
admitted in violation of the trial court's order excluding I.R.E. 404(b) evidence 
and, alternatively, has she failed to show any basis for reversal? 
4. Has Moskios failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
by not limiting the state's cross-examination of Carlos Pinto? 
5. Is Moskios' claim of instructional error barred by the invited error doctrine? 




Moskios Is Not Entitled To Appellate Review Of Her Claim Of Improper Joinder 
Because She Failed To Preserve It By Way Of Objection Below And Has Failed 
To Argue. Much Less Establish. Fundamental Error 
For the first time on appeal, Moskios argues that she was prejudiced by 
the consolidation of her case with that of her co-defendant, Samantha 
Martindale. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) Moskios concedes that "[n]o motion for 
relief from prejudicial joinder was ever filed in the case." (Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
Nevertheless, she asks this Court to grant her a new trial because, she 
contends, "joinder in this case was not proper." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) This 
Court must decline to consider the merits of Moskios' improper joinder claim 
because Moskios did not assert it below and, therefore, failed to preserve the 
issue for appeal. 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 
125, 129 (1995)). Nor will Idaho's appellate courts "review a trial court's alleged 
error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the 
basis for the assignment of error." State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 
942, 946 (1993); also State v. Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 442, 64 P.3d 967, 971 
(Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231,235,985 P.2d 111, 115 
(1999)). An exception to these principles exists if the alleged error constitutes 
fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 976. However, the 
burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the defendant 
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asserting the error for the first time on appeal. ~at_, 245 P.3d at 980; State 
v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 717, 215 P.3d 414, 437 (2009). To carry that 
burden, a defendant claiming error for the first time on appeal must demonstrate 
that the error she alleges "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 980. 
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case shows that 
Moskios waived appellate consideration of her improper joinder claim. Moskios 
did not file a motion to sever or otherwise object to the consolidation of her case 
with that of Martindale's. (See generally, R.; see also Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
Nor has she argued on appeal that consolidation of the cases constituted 
fundamental error under the standards articulated in Perry, supra. (See 
generally, Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) Because the issue was neither presented 
to or decided by the trial court, and because Moskios has not even asserted 
fundamental error, much less attempted to carry her burden of demonstrating it, 
this Court must decline to consider the merits of Moskios' improper joinder claim. 
11. 
Moskios Has Failed To Present Her Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim For 
Appellate Review 
As an alternative to her unpreserved claim of improper joinder, Moskios 
asks this Court to grant her a new trial on the basis that trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to file a motion to sever. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) 
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Moskios' ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not appropriately before this 
court on direct appeal because it was not raised or developed before the district 
court and would be more appropriately addressed in a post-conviction 
proceeding. 
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a claim not raised before the 
district court will not be considered on appeal. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether the claim was preserved is a 
"threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 
(Ct. App. 1989). Consistent with the preservation principle, Idaho's appellate 
courts generally will not consider an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Blackburn, 99 Idaho 222, 222-
223, 579 P.2d 1205, 1205-06 (1978) ("The record before us on this appeal is 
devoid of any factual information to support Blackburn's [ineffective assistance of 
counsel] claims. The proper forum for raising those allegations is post conviction 
proceedings as provided by I.C. § 19-4901 et seq."); State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 
374, 375-376, 859 P.2d 972, 973-74 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Both our Supreme Court 
and this Court have often stated that it is generally inappropriate to raise a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal from the judgment of 
conviction. Rather, such claims are more appropriately presented through post-
conviction relief proceedings where an evidentiary record can be developed."). 
The reasons underlying the appellate courts' general unwillingness to consider 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time on appeal is the lack of 
an adequate record and the resulting consequence that an adverse decision 
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would prevent a defendant from developing the claim in a more appropriate 
forum because the claim would be barred by res judicata. Mitchell, 124 Idaho at 
376, 859 P .2d at 97 4; see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 
961, 976 {2010) (adopting three-part test for reviewing claims of fundamental 
error, including requirement that defendant demonstrate "the error must be clear 
or obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision"). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Smith v. State, 146 
Idaho 822, 834, 203 P .3d 1221, 1233 (2009): 
This Court has recognized that a defendant may raise the issue of 
the effectiveness of counsel from a trial resulting in a criminal 
conviction, while cautioning that this course of action may result in 
application of the doctrine of res judicata. Parrott v. State, 117 
Idaho 272, 274, 787 P.2d 258, 260 (1990) (stating that a defendant 
may appeal counsel's effectiveness at trial directly or in a post-
conviction proceeding, but he may not do both). We recognize that 
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel usually requires an 
evidentiary hearing, and resolution of such claims can be difficult 
for an appellate court examining a trial record in which counsel's 
performance was not at issue. Carler v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791, 
702 P.2d 826, 829 (1985) (citation omitted). 
Although the Court in Smith deviated from the general policy against 
entertaining an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time on 
appeal, it did so, in part, on "procedural policy grounds." 146 Idaho at 834, 203 
P.3d at 1233. Specifically, Smith was challenging his designation as a violent 
sexual predator ("VSP") on grounds that were not preserved, and he argued the 
claims were not preserved due to ineffective assistance of counsel. M.,_ Smith 
contended that if he could not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
for the first time on appeal from the district court's order affirming his VSP 
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designation, he would never be able to do so because there was "no procedural 
vehicle for this claim." kl The Court agreed, concluding, "Because there do not 
appear to be any other procedural grounds for the relief Smith seeks and 
because we believe that the record on appeal is sufficient to determine whether 
his claims have merit, we will consider Smith's claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal." kl 
Moskios does not cite Smith, nor rely on its rationale, in explaining why 
she believes her ineffective assistance of counsel claim is appropriate for 
consideration for the first time on direct appeal. Nor does Smith compel 
consideration of Moskios' claim. Unlike Smith, who had no other procedural 
mechanism for bringing his claim, Moskios can raise her ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim in an application for post-conviction relief brought pursuant to the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. § 19-4901, et. seq. This Court 
should require her to do so because, unlike Smith, the record in this case has 
not been sufficiently developed to address the merits of Moskios' claim. 
To prove her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Moskios must 
demonstrate both that her counsel's performance was deficient - i.e., that it was 
based on some objective shortcoming and not the result of sound trial strategy -
and that she was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984). The record in this case is insufficient to address even the 
deficient performance prong of Moskios' ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
because there is no evidence regarding the reasons counsel did not move to 
sever Moskios' case from that of her co-defendant, Samantha Martindale. In 
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light of the fact that Moskios' trial counsel also represented Martindale, it is 
entirely conceivable that counsel had a tactical reason or strategy behind not 
filing a motion to sever. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court 
must presume that the decision was strategic. State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 
923, 655 P.2d 434, 440 (1981) (where ineffective assistance of counsel is raised 
as an issue on direct appeal, absent established facts to the contrary, "it must be 
presumed that defense counsel's actions were not due to inadequate 
preparation or ignorance, and that defendant's representation by counsel was 
competently carried out"). 
Because Moskios' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not raised 
or developed before the district court, and because there is no policy reason for 
considering the claim for the first time on appeal since Moskios can still pursue 
the claim in post-conviction, this Court should decline to address Moskios' 
argument that trial counsel was ineffective. If the Court does consider Moskios' 
claim, it should find that Moskios has failed to carry her burden of showing that 
counsel was ineffective. 
111. 
Moskios Did Not Preserve For Appeal Her Claim That Evidence Was Admitted In 
Violation Of The Court's Order Excluding I.RE. 404(b) Evidence And, 
Alternatively, Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal 
A. Introduction 
Prior to trial, the state moved in limine to present in its case in chief I.R.E. 
404(b) evidence of Moskios' and Martindale's knowledge of and participation in 
prior drug transactions. (R., pp.92-100.) Specifically, the state sought to elicit 
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testimony from the confidential informant that: (1) Martindale was usually present 
when he purchased marijuana from Brian Pinto and, on more than one occasion, 
Martindale directly participated in the delivery of marijuana to him (R., p.96; Tr., 
p.47, Ls.9-18); and (2) Moskios was present on at least five prior occasions 
when he purchased marijuana from Brian Pinto and/or Martindale and that 
"during all of those transactions, except the currently charged transaction, 
[MoskiosJ was smoking marijuana and involved in the conversation of marijuana 
sales, weight, quality, and arrangement of the next deal" (R., p.96). The state 
also sought to elicit testimony from Detective Berrier regarding Moskios' and 
Martindale's post-Miranda statements in which "they both admit[tedJ to knowing 
that dealing was going on, knowing that they used cash for - to pay their bills 
from that dealing, knowing where the cash was kept, [and] knowing that large 
quantities of marijuana were either stored in vehicles or their home." (Tr., p.47, 
L.23 - p.48, L.8; also R., pp.96-97.) The state argued the proffered 
evidence was relevant to prove Moskios' and Martindale's knowledge, intent and 
motive to possess the marijuana they were charged with possessing in this case. 
(R., pp.92-99; Tr., p.47, L.9 - p.49, L.16.) 
Following a hearing, at which Moskios' counsel objected only on the 
asserted basis that the state had failed to give timely notice of its proffered I.R. 
404(b) evidence (Tr., p.49, L.23 - p.53, L.25, p.58, L.8 - p.61, L.22), the district 
court ruled the proffered evidence unduly prejudicial and therefore inadmissible 
in the state's case in chief. (Tr., p.62, L.17 - p.64, L.10, p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13, 
p.67, Ls.6-10.) The court reasoned: 
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... [T]he indictment alleges, in this particular case, that the 
defendant did knowingly bring into the state, and/or was in actual or 
constructive possession of 5 pounds or more of marijuana. So, in 
that in this particular case, while that's called drug trafficking, the 
fact that she had been involved in drug trafficking at other times 
wouldn't necessarily be relevant to the fact that the defendant in 
this case was in constructive possession or in actual possession of 
this marijuana. 
. .. I would normally allow the 4 - the 404(b) evidence, but in 
this particular case, ... the probative value of it would be 
outweighed by the prejudicial value, because of the fact that the 
defendant is not charged with being part of the business in this 
particular case or - and, in fact, the allegations there did not 
indicate that ... either defendant had ... a financial interest in the 
selling of the marijuana. 
(Tr., p.63, Ls.1-22; see also Tr., p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13.) When asked by the 
state for clarification whether the defendants' statements to Detective Berrier 
"regarding prior incidents that they were aware of" were not admissible in the 
state's case in chief, the district court responded, "Yes." (Tr., p.64, Ls.12-17.) 
The court clarified, however, that such statements may be admissible for rebuttal 
or impeachment. (Tr., p.64, L.19 - p.65, L.3, p.67, Ls.6-10.) 
For the first time on appeal, Moskios argues that evidence was admitted 
in violation of the court's ruling prohibiting use of the state's proposed I.RE. 
404(b) evidence in its case in chief. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-8.) This Court 
should decline to consider the merits of Moskios' argument because she did not 
object below to the alleged violations of the court's order and she has not 
argued, much less established, that the allegedly erroneous admission of the 
challenged evidence constituted fundamental error. Even if preserved by the 
trial court's general order excluding the state's I.RE. 404(b) evidence, Moskios 
has failed to show any basis for reversal because a review of the record shows 
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no clear violation of the district court's ruling; even there was, the admission of 
the evidence in violation of the court's order was harmless because it did not 
result in the introduction of any evidence actually prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b). 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Whether an issue was preserved presents a "threshold" inquiry. State v. 
Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The interpretation of an unambiguous court order presents a question of 
law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Suchan v. Suchan, 113 
Idaho 102, 106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1987); Sun Valley Ranches. Inc. v. Prairie 
Power Cooperative, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 131, 856 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Ct. App. 
1993). The interpretation of an ambiguous court order, on the other hand, 
presents a question of fact. Suchan, 113 Idaho at 106, 741 P.2d at 1293. 
C. This Court Must Decline To Consider Moskios' Claim That Evidence Was 
Admitted In Violation Of The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b) Ruling Because 
Moskios Did Not Preserve The Issue By Way Of Objection Below And 
Has Not Argued. Much Less Established. That The Allegedly Erroneous 
Admission Of The Evidence Constituted Fundamental Error 
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it constitutes 
fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 P.3d 961, 976 
(2010); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) (review 
denied July 7, 2011 ); State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 
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(Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to 
remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the 
defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." Perry, 150 Idaho at 245 P.3d at 976. Review 
without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that "one or 
more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the 
constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any 
additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to object 
was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable 
probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." kl at 
_, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Citing United States Supreme Court precedent, the Idaho Supreme Court 
recently explained the rationale underlying the contemporaneous objection 
requirement and fundamental error review as follows: 
"This limitation on appellate-court authority serves to induce the 
timely raising of claims and objections, which gives the [trial] court 
the opportunity to consider and resolve them. Puckett v. U.S., [556 
U.S. 129, _, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428] (2009). Ordinarily, the trial 
court is in the best position to determine the relevant facts and to 
adjudicate the dispute. Id. "In the case of an actual or invited 
procedural error, the [trial] court can often correct or avoid the 
mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome." Id. 
Furthermore, requiring a contemporaneous objection prevents the 
litigant from sandbagging the court, i.e., "remaining silent about his 
objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not 
conclude in his favor." Id. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 976 (brackets original). Because one of the 
purposes of the contemporaneous objection requirement is to promote the timely 
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raising of objections to the trial court, who is generally best situated to consider 
and resolve them, the appellate court "will not pore through a trial transcript and 
evaluate [each claim of error] in order to determine whether there is 
objectionable material, let alone add them up and analyze them as a collective 
due process violation." Norton, 151 Idaho at_, 254 P.3d at 84. 
For the first time on appeal, Moskios identifies, in extremely general 
terms, several instances in which she contends evidence was admitted in 
violation of the district court's I.R.E. 404(b) ruling. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-8.) 
Moskios apparently believes that the district court's pretrial order excluding the 
state's proffered 404(b) evidence was itself sufficient to preserve for appeal her 
claims that evidence was admitted in violation of that order. Moskios is incorrect. 
"Even where a pretrial motion preserves an evidentiary objection for appeal, the 
defense may waive the objection during trial." State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 
794, 932 P.2d 907, 917 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). Generallzed 
argument made in response to a pretrial motion in limine does not preserve for 
appellate review specific objections to evidence ultimately admitted. State v. 
Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 220-21, 207 P.3d 186, 196-97 (Ct. App. 2009). Rather, 
"[f]or an objection to be preserved for appellate review, the specific ground for 
the objection must be clearly stated." State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 
P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing I.R.E. 103(a)(1 ); State v. Gleason, 130 
Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997)); accord Parmer, 147 Idaho 
at 220-21, 207 P.3d at 196-97; Gray, 129 Idaho at 794, 932 P.2d at 917; cf. 
Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233, 240 n.4, 233 P.3d 164, 171 n.4 (Ct. App. 2010) 
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(district court not required to sua sponte strike portions of testimony that varied 
from offer of proof made in support of motion in limine). 
Moskios waived her challenges to the evidence she contends was 
admitted in violation of the district court's I.RE. 404(b) ruling by not raising those 
challenges at trial. In response to the state's motion in limine Moskios argued 
only that a portion of the state's proffered 404(b) evidence should be excluded 
on the basis that it was not timely disclosed. (Tr., p.49, L.23 - p.53, L.25, p.58, 
L.8 - p.61, L.22.) The district court rejected this as a basis for exclusion, but 
held the evidence inadmissible in the state's case in chief based on its 
determination that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. (Tr., p.62, 
L.17 - p.64, L.10, p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13, p.67, Ls.6-10.) Moskios never argued 
to the district court that the evidence she challenges for the first time on appeal 
violated either the substantive provisions of I.R.E. 404(b) or the district court's 
ruling. (See generally Tr., pp.150, 200, 220-43, 383-413.) Having failed to do 
so, there has been no determination by the trial court whether the challenged 
evidence actually fell within the scope of the trial court's ruling and, if so, whether 
events subsequent to the district court's in limine ruling rendered the evidence 
admissible. (See Tr., p.64, Ls.4-10, p.65, Ls.1-3, p.67, Ls.6-9 (clarifying that 
evidence may be admissible as impeachment and/or rebuttal).) The issue 
Moskios raises was thus not preserved for appeal. 
Because Moskios failed to object below to the evidence she now contends 
was admitted in violation of the court's I.RE. 404(b) ruling, she is only entitled to 
appellate review of her claim if she can demonstrate fundamental error. Perry, 
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150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 976. Moskios has not even attempted to carry her 
burden on appeal and, even if she had, such attempt would fail. Whether the 
alleged error is regarded strictly as a violation of the district court's pretrial order 
or as the admission of evidence prohibited by I.RE. 404(b), the fundamental 
error doctrine "is not invoked" because neither claim implicates a constitutional 
right. Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 978 ("[W]here ... the asserted error 
relates not to infringement upon a constitutional right, but to a violation of a rule 
or statute ... the 'fundamental error' doctrine is not invoked."); Norton, 151 Idaho 
at_, 254 P.3d at 83-84 (noting that the requirements of I.RE. 404(b) "are not 
of constitutional import" and rejecting "attempts to characterize alleged 
evidentiary errors, to which no objection was made at trial, as a due process 
violation of the right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal"). Because Moskios' claim of 
error fails under the first prong of the fundamental error analysis set forth in 
Perry, she is not entitled to appellate review of that claim for the first time on 
appeal. 
D. Even If Preserved, Moskios Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal 
Based On The Alleged Violations Of The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b} 
Ruling 
1. The Evidence Moskios Challenges Was Not Clearly Excluded By 
The District Court's Pretrial Ruling 
Even if Moskios' claims that evidence was admitted in violation of the 
district court's I.RE. 404(b) ruling are deemed preserved, Moskios has failed to 
show any basis for reversal because a review of the record shows the 
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challenged evidence was not clearly excluded by the district court's pretrial 
ruling. 
The district court ruled that the state could not present in its case in chief 
evidence concerning Moskios' and Martindale's knowledge of or participation in 
prior drug transactions. (Tr., p.62, L.20 - p.64, L.17, p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13, 
p.67, Ls.6-10.) Although Moskios does not identify the precise testimony she 
believes was admitted in violation of this order, she appears to argue that the 
state violated this ruling 1 by eliciting testimony from Detective Berrier on direct 
examination that Martindale made post-Miranda statements to the effect that she 
knew Brian Pinto had extra cash, she paid bills with the extra cash, she knew 
where Brian kept the cash, she knew Brian obtained marijuana from Carlos 
Pinto, and she was aware of "individuals coming to the residence and visiting 
with Brian in the bedroom for a short period of time and then leaving." (Tr., 
p.149, L.25 - p.151, L.1; Appellant's brief, p.6.) Moskios argues in conclusory 
fashion that this evidence related only to Martindale's "knowledge of previous 
drug dealing activities, which the court had ruled impermissible and prejudicial." 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) Moskios is incorrect because, on its face, the evidence 
discloses nothing about Martindale's knowledge of or participation in prior drug 
dealings and at no point did the prosecutor attempt to tie Martindale's statements 
to anything other than her knowledge as it related to the charged incident. (See 
1 Moskios does not contend that the violations she alleges constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct; rather, she contends only that the alleged violations 
resulted in the introduction of inadmissible evidence. (See generally Appellant's 
brief, pp.6-8.) 
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Tr., p.148, L.16- p.151, L.1.) Moskios has failed to show that the admission of 
this evidence violated the court's order. 
Moskios next argues that the state violated the district court's pretrial 
ruling by asking Detective Berrier on redirect examination "whether people going 
to a bedroom and staying for short periods of time is consistent with sales of 
marijuana." (Appellant's brief, p.6 (citing Tr., p.200).) Again, Moskios has failed 
to show a clear violation of the district court's order because, on its face, the 
challenged evidence does not even implicate Moskios' or Martindale's 
knowledge of or participation in prior drug transactions. 
Moskios next contends that the state violated the district court's pretrial 
ruling during its direct examination of the confidential informant by asking him 
questions about the "frequency and nature of drug transactions" between Carlos 
Pinto and himself. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) According to Moskios, "the only 
possible relevance" of this evidence was to show that "these four individuals had 
a consistent and ongoing drug-dealing relationship, and that therefore the two 
co-defendants on trial at the time, Ms. Moskios and Ms. Martindale must have 
had knowledge of it." (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7 (citing Tr., pp.220-430).) Moskios 
has failed to identify any specific testimony that she contends actually violated 
the court's order, however. Having failed to do so, she has failed to demonstrate 
any error in the admission of the evidence. See,~. I.AR. 35; State v. Walker, 
121 Idaho 18, 20, 822 P.2d 537, 539 (Ct. App. 1991) (appellate court will neither 
"search the record for unspecified error" nor presume error); State v. Hoisington, 
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104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983) (appellate court will not search the 
record for errors). 
Moskios finally argues that the state violated the district court's pretrial 
ruling by cross-examining Carlos Pinto - who at the time of trial was Moskios' 
husband (Tr., p.370, L.20 - p.371, L.7) - regarding "the nature of his ongoing 
drug-sales," "the lifestyle he led upon those proceeds," "whether or not Ms. 
Moskios had knowledge of the extent of Mr. Pinto's marijuana grow operations," 
"the lifestyle and assets and the price of those assets," and "Moskios' past 
knowledge of the drug operations" (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8 (citing Tr., p.383-
413)). Contrary to Moskios' assertions, however, this evidence was not admitted 
in violation of the district court's pretrial ruling but was instead properly admitted 
to impeach Carlos Pinto's testimony, a purpose for which the district court 
specifically ruled that evidence of Moskios' prior knowledge of and participation 
in prior drug transactions may be admitted. (Tr., p.64, L.4 - p.66, L.13, p.67, 
Ls.6-9.) 
Carlos testified on direct examination that when he and Moskios left their 
house in Bend on the date of the charged incident, Moskios had no idea that 
there was 21 pounds of marijuana in the back of her car. (Tr., p.371, L.23 -
p.374, L.21, p.377, Ls.15-23.) He testified that he did not tell Moskios about the 
marijuana until they were well into their trip, at which point Carlos claimed that 
Moskios "lost it" and became "very angry." (Tr., p.377, L.15 - p.378, L.9.) He 
also testified that Moskios did not have any contact with the marijuana after they 
arrived at Brian Pinto's home. (Tr., p.379, L.13 - p.382, L.2.) The clear 
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implication of Carlos' testimony was that Moskios did not know of the marijuana's 
presence and had neither physical control of it, nor the power and intention to 
control it - elements the state was required to prove in relation to the charged 
crime. See ICJI 421 (defining possession). The state's questioning of Carlos on 
cross-examination regarding Moskios' knowledge of, participation in, and profit 
from previous marijuana transactions was directly impeaching of Carlos' 
testimony that Moskios was originally unaware of, and then upset by, the 
presence of 21 pounds of marijuana in her car. The district court ruled as much, 
as it overruled Moskios' objection to the state's initial questioning of Carlos as 
being beyond the scope of direct examination (Tr., p.383, L.16 - p.384, L.5) and 
agreed with the state that evidence that Moskios knew about prior drug sales 
and profited therefrom was relevant to impeach Carlos Pinto's testimony that 
Moskios did not know anything about the marijuana she was charged with 
possessing in this case (Tr., p.397, L.18 - p.399, L.1). Because the evidence 
was admitted for impeachment, Moskios has failed to show any violation of the 
court's pretrial ruling. 
2. Any Error In The Admission Of Evidence In Violation Of The District 
Court's Ruling Is Harmless Because It Did Not Result In The 
Introduction Of Evidence Actually Prohibited By I.R.E. 404(b) 
The district court ruled the proffered I.R. 404(b) evidence inadmissible 
in the state's case in chief based on its determination that the evidence was 
unfairly prejudicial. (Tr., p.62, L.20 - p.64, L.17, p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13, p.67, 
Ls.6-10.) Correct application of the law to the facts shows, however, that the 
district court's ruling was incorrect. The proffered evidence was relevant to 
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establish Moskios' knowledge and intent to possess the marijuana at issue in this 
case, and its probative value for this purpose was not substantially outweighed 
by any attendant danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, even if some evidence was 
admitted in violation of the trial court's pretrial ruling, such did not result in 
reversible error because it did not result in the introduction of evidence actually 
prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b). See I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). 
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is relevant for any purpose 
other than to prove the defendant's character in order to show she acted in 
conformity therewith, and (b) the potential prejudice associated with proof of 
character does not substantially outweigh the proper probative value of the 
evidence. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 
(1999). The first prong of this test is met if the evidence is admissible for any 
purpose other than proving character and actions in conformity therewith, 
including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 
Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 
647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence 
if the danger of unfair prejudice from having the jury conclude the defendant is of 
bad character substantially outweighs its proper probative value. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-276, 77 P.3d 956, 964-965 (2003). 
Evidence concerning Moskios' knowledge of and participation in prior 
marijuana sales was relevant for purposes other than proving Moskios' character 
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and was not unfairly prejudicial. The state in this case was required to prove that 
Moskios had actual or constructive possession of the marijuana that was the 
subject of the controlled buy. (R., pp.158, 160 Uury instructions requiring state to 
prove possession); see also IC,JI 421(pattern instruction on possession).) 
Evidence that Moskios knew of and participated in Carlos Pinto's prior deliveries 
of marijuana to Brian Pinto, and that she profited therefrom, was directly relevant 
to establish Moskios' knowledge of and intent to control the marijuana that she 
and Carlos transported from Bend to Boise in her vehicle. I.RE. 401; State v. 
Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 735 P.2d 1089 (1987). 
Contrary to the district court's determination, the evidence was not unfairly 
prejudicial. In State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 785 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1989), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals stated, "[a]II probative evidence is, to some extent, 
prejudicial. The question is whether that prejudice is unfair - that is, whether it 
harms the defendant not because of inferences which reasonably can be drawn 
from the facts, but because it inflames the jury and rouses them to 
'overmastering hostility.'" Gauna, 117 Idaho at 88, 785 P.2d at 652. In that 
case, the court affirmed the admission of testimony from a witness/informant that 
she had previously purchased marijuana from Gauna, reasoning, "[w]hile the 
witness' testimony certainly bolstered the likelihood that Gauna possessed drugs 
for reasons other than personal use, we do not believe it was so inflammatory 
that it would lead a jury to convict Gauna regardless of other facts presented.'' 
kl at 87-88, 785 P.2d at 651-52. 
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The reasoning of Gauna applies equally to the circumstances of this case. 
While evidence of Moskios' knowledge of and participation in prior marijuana 
deliveries certainly bolstered the likelihood that Moskios knowingly possessed 
the marijuana she was charged with trafficking in this case, it was not so 
inflammatory that it would have led the jury to convict her regardless of other 
facts presented. Indeed, given the undisputed evidence that Moskios became 
aware during her trip from Bend to Kuna that she was transporting 21 pounds of 
marijuana in her vehicle, there is very little danger that the jury convicted 
Moskios based solely on her participation in prior drug transactions. 
Because the state's 404(b) evidence was both relevant and not unfairly 
prejudicial, any error arising from the admission of that evidence in violation of 
the court's pretrial ruling did not affect Moskios' substantial rights. Because 
there was no error affecting Moskios' right to a fair trial, there was no reversible 
error that would require this court to reverse Moskios' conviction. 
IV. 
Moskios Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Not Limiting The State's Cross-Examination Of Carlos Pinto 
A. Introduction 
Moskios argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the 
state to cross-examine Carlos Pinto as to matters that she contends were 
outside the scope of direct examination. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-11.) To the 
extent Moskios challenges "the entire line of questioning which ensued on cross-
examination" (Appellant's brief, p.9), such challenge was not preserved by way of 
a timely objection below and, as such, is not appropriately before this court on 
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appeal. As to the only preserved challenges, Moskios has failed to establish an 
abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Whether an issue was preserved presents a "threshold" inquiry. State v. 
Stevens, 115 Idaho 457,459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The control of cross-examination is committed to the sound discretion of 
the trial judge. State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 247 P.3d 204, 209 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (review denied Feb. 23, 2011 ); State v. Rauch, 144 Idaho 682, 685, 
168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 2007}. A decision to admit or deny evidence will 
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. 
ilL When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the 
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with 
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3} whether 
the lower court reached its decision by exercise of reason. Rauch, 144 Idaho at 
685, 168 P.3d at 1032. 
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C. Moskios Failed To Preserve For Appeal Her Challenge To The "Entire 
Line Of Questioning Which Ensued On Cross-Examination" 
Moskios argues that the district court abused its discretion by not limiting 
the state's cross-examination of Carlos Pinto, arguing that "the entire line of 
questioning which ensued on cross-examination" went to matters that the court 
had previously ruled inadmissible pursuant to its pretrial ruling on the state's 
motion to use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) Moskios did not 
object to "the entire line of questioning" below and, as such, failed to preserve 
the issue for appeal. LR. 103(a)(1) (error may not be predicated upon a 
ruling admitting evidence unless "a timely objection or motion to strike appears of 
record"); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000) ("It 
is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."). Nor can she 
demonstrate that the alleged error is fundamental because it does not implicate, 
much less violate, one of her unwaived constitutional rights. State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho at 209, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). Thus, the issue Moskios raises is 
not properly before this Court on appeal. 
D. Moskios Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Not Limiting The State's Cross-examination Of Carlos Pinto 
In Response To Specific Objections That Such Examination Was Beyond 
The Scope Of Direct Examination 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (b) governs the scope of cross-examination 
and provides: "Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the 
direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court 
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on 
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direct examination." I.R.E. 611 (b). "The appropriate scope of cross examination 
includes not only the facts testified to on direct examination, but other facts 
connected with those facts, directly or indirectly, tending to explain, modify, or 
qualify the inferences resulting from the direct examination." State v. Brummett, 
150 Idaho 339, _, 247 P.3d 204, 209 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Starry, 96 
Idaho 148, 150, 525 P.2d 343, 345 (1974)); accord State v. Rauch, 144 Idaho 
682, 685, 168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The subject matter of Carlos Pinto's testimony on direct examination 
related almost exclusively to his assertions that Moskios was initially unaware 
that her vehicle contained 21 pounds of marijuana and that she never had either 
physical control of the marijuana or the power and intention to control it. (Tr., 
p.370, L.15 - p.383, L.12.) Over defense counsel's objections, the district court 
allowed the state on cross-examination to ask Carlos whether he was employed 
on the date of the charged offense (Tr., p.383, L.18 - p.384, L.5), and whether 
he and Moskios had traveled before with marijuana in their car (Tr., p.408, L.9 -
p.409, L.4). Although Moskios argues otherwise, these questions (which were 
the only questions specifically objected to by Moskios as being beyond the scope 
of direct examination) did not exceed the scope of direct examination. Moskios' 
knowledge of and intent to possess the marijuana she was charged with 
trafficking in this case was a material issue in the case and was put squarely at 
issue by Carlos' testimony on direct examination. The prosecutor's questions, 
which related to Carlos' and Moskios' finances and Moskios' knowledge on prior 
occasions that she and Carlos had traveled before with marijuana in their 
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vehicle, tended both to impeach Carlos' credibility and to explain, modify, or 
qualify the inferences resulting from his direct testimony that Moskios did not 
possess the requisite knowledge or intent. Moskios has thus failed to establish 
that the district court abused its discretion in allowing these lines of inquiry. 
V. 
Moskios Is Precluded By The Invited Error Doctrine From Challenging On Appeal 
A Jury Instruction She Requested 
A. Introduction 
Moskios argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by giving 
the pattern jury instruction on constructive possession. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-
16.) Because a review of the record shows that Moskios actually asked the 
district court to give the challenged instruction, Moskios' claim is barred by the 
doctrine of invited error. 
B. Moskios Cannot Assert As Error On Appeal The Giving Of An Instruction 
Which She Herself Requested 
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an 
error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error." State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, _, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. 
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). "One may 
not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in." Norton, 151 
Idaho at _, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 
P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 
(Ct. App. 1998)). These principles apply equally in cases of alleged instructional 
error. In other words, an "'[a]ppellant cannot assert as error on appeal the giving 
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of an instruction which he himself requested."' State v. Draper, _ P.3d _, 
2011 WL 4030069, *11 (2011) (quoting State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 363, 
690 P.2d 293, 298 (1984)). A review of the record in this case shows that 
Moskios' claim of instructional error is barred under the doctrine of invited error. 
Before the state rested its case, the district court gave the parties copies 
of its proposed final jury instructions, including the following pattern jury 
instruction on constructive possession: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
A person has possession of something if the person knows 
of its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and 
intention to control it. More than one person can be in possession 
of something if each knows of its presence and has the power and 
intention to control it. 
(R., p.158; see also Tr., p.306, Ls.5-11; compare ICJI 421.) Moskios initially 
objected to the pattern instruction and requested that it be modified to require the 
state to prove that that the defendants had the power and intent to exercise both 
"dominion and control' over the marijuana at issue. (Tr., p.306, L.5 - p.307, 
L.16, p.308, L.16-p.309, L.13.) The district court granted Moskios' request 
and, over the state's objection to the inclusion of the word "dominion," indicated it 
would modify Instruction No. 11 to require the state to prove that the defendants 
had the "power and intent to exercise dominion and control over" the controlled 
substances. (Tr., p.307, L.17-p.308, L.14, p.311, L.9-p.315, L.2.) 
After the defense rested and the state indicated it did not have any 
rebuttal witnesses, the district court conducted an in-chambers conference with 
counsel. (R., p.298; Tr., p.417, L.20 - p.419, L.21.) Following the conference, 
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the court placed on the record the substance of the in-chambers discussion as 
follows: 
... [W]e had a discussion. And based on that discussion, 
the Court is going to reverse itself and decide to give the ICJI 
instruction on constructive possession, rather than the one with the 
word dominion. And so, ... Instruction No. 11 will be replaced by 
original Instruction 11 that you have in - in your copies. 
(Tr., p.420, L.25 - p.421, L.7.) Moskios' counsel then stated for the record: 
... I did discuss that with my clients, and I think I - briefly, 
but we had talked about the issue of the instruction before, so they 
were generally aware of it. But they - I informed them of the issues 
involved, and they thought that was - the resolution that the Court 
had proposed, and that we had all decided in chambers, was 
appropriate. 
(Tr., p.421, Ls.8-15.) With Moskios' consent, the district court ultimately gave 
the pattern instruction on constructive possession. (R., p.158.) 
After the jury found her guilty of trafficking in marijuana, Moskios moved 
for a new trial, alleging, inter a/ia, that the trial court had coerced her into 
retracting her request for a modified constructive possession instruction. (R., 
pp.173-76, 240-41, 253-59.) The district court denied Moskios' motion and, in so 
doing, made the following uncontested findings of fact in relation to Moskios' 
claim of coercion: 
As a visiting judge, I received a set of instructions prepared 
by Judge Williamson that had been given to counsel. On the first 
morning of trial, there were no requested jury instructions by the 
defense on the subject of constructive possession on file. The first 
time the Court knew that the defense was contesting the validity of 
proposed Instruction No. 11, was at the jury instruction conference 
at the end of the second day of trial. 
Without having time for a complete analysis, the Court 
decided to give the instruction requested by the defense. That was 
identical to Instruction No. 11 except that to find the defendants 
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guilty the jury would have to find that defendants had the "power 
and intention to exercise dominion and control" over the marijuana 
(emphasis added}. 
Sometime during the third day of trial, I realized that 
requiring the additional fact of dominion would place an unfair 
burden on the state unless I also admitted at least some 404(b} 
evidence that I earlier ruled should not at all be admitted. At the 
close of the state's rebuttal, I held a conference with counsel in 
chambers. At that time, I told counsel that because of the 
additional burden put on the state, I would allow at least some 
404(b) evidence if the sate wished to do so. The state stated that it 
did so wish. At that time, defense counsel asked the Court if it 
would stick to its earlier ruling excluding all 404(b) evidence if the 
defense withdrew its request to give the "dominion" instruction. I 
replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, Instruction No. 11 was given 
to the jury. 
The Court finds that there was no judicial misconduct or 
prejudicial error as to Instruction No. 11. Since the time of trial, the 
Court has come to the conclusion that it was proper to give 
Instruction No. 11, since the Supreme Court has never adopted the 
"dominion" portion that has been adopted by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals . . . . However, the Court also holds that defense counsel 
was not coerced into withdrawing his request for the "dominion" 
instruction. Instead, defense counsel conferred with his clients, 
and as a matter of trial tactics determined to keep all 404(b} 
evidence out by agreeing to the ICJI instruction. 
(R., pp.298-99 (emphasis and parenthetical reference thereto original}.} 
On appeal, Moskios argues that the district court erred, as a matter of law, 
by giving the pattern jury instruction on constructive possession, as opposed to 
an instruction that would have required the state to prove that she had the power 
and intent to exercise both dominion and control over the marijuana. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-16.) Moskios fails to point out what the record 
affirmatively shows, however - i.e., that Moskios retracted her request for a 
modified instruction and specifically asked the district court to give the pattern 
instruction instead. (R., pp.298-99; Tr., p.420, L.25 - p.421, L.15.) Moskios 
32 
does not challenge the district court's determination that that choice was not the 
result of coercion, but was instead the product of trial strategy. (See R., p.299.) 
Nor would such claim be supported by the record. Moskios' counsel took pains 
to make a record that he had discussed the issues surrounding the choice of 
which instruction to request with his clients and that his clients agreed to the 
resolution proposed in chambers. (Tr., p.421, Ls.8-15.) Because Moskios 
chose, as a matter of trial strategy to request the giving of the pattern instruction 
on constructive possession, she is barred by the invited error doctrine from 
challenging that instruction on appeal. I;&., Draper, _ P .3d _, 2011 WL 
4030069, *11. 
VI. 
Moskios Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. 
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, 
cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found 
fundamental. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010). 
Moskios has failed to show any error, much less two or more errors. Thus, the 
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See, ~. LaBelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Moskios guilty of trafficking in marijuana. 
DATED this 24th day of October 2011. 
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